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PREFACE.

In the third volume of the Journal, herewith completed, a more systematic attempt has been made to present the systems of Fichte and Hegel. A complete translation of "The New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge" by the former, together with an excellent essay on Kant's System of Transcendentalism by Mr. Kroeger, will furnish the best available means for studying Fichte's Philosophy. The portions translated from Hegel's Philosophical Propædæutics, embracing the outlines of the Logic and Phenomenology, together with the brief commentary added by the Editor, will prove, it is hoped, acceptable to students of Hegel. The work thus begun, if continued according to the plan laid out for the next volume, will give English versions of Hegel's Philosophy of Rights, Morals, and Religion, together with the outlines of the Encyclopædia of Philosophy. The translation of the Phenomenology begun in the second volume of the Journal, and the analysis and commentary of the same, will again be taken up. Through the activity of Mr. Kroeger another exposition of the Science of Knowledge and one also of Fichte's Philosophy of Rights have been given to the public by the house of Messrs. Lippincott & Co. These works, with the translations of Fichte's popular writings by Smith (published in London), leave very little to be desired by the English student of that system. Such, however, is not the case with Hegel. No one of his greatest works has yet been translated entire into any foreign language. To name these greatest works in the order of importance, one would place—

- 1st. The Logic (3 vols.);
- 2d. The Phenomenology of Spirit (1 vol.);
- 3d. The History of Philosophy (3 vols.);
- 4th. The Æsthetics (3 vols.);
- 5th. The Philosophy of Religion (2 vols.);
- 6th. The Philosophy of Rights.

The 7th—the Philosophy of History—has been translated and published in English; the 8th—Philosophy of Nature—has been translated and published in French. The translations that have appeared in English and French give only meagre compends intended for the use of pupils—who were expected to get the full details from the lectures of Hegel himself—or else they consist of weak paraphrases, in which the scientific part of the original is either mutilated or omitted altogether (e. g. Bénard's edition* of the Æsthetic, "partly a transla-

* The portion of the work of Bénard given in this Journal professes to be no more than an analysis of the Æsthetics; as such it will pay reperusal from the beginning, now that it is completed. The most instructive portion of it is that contained in the first volume of the Journal.

tion, partly an analysis," and Sloman & Wallon's English version of the "Subjective Logic.")

Compends and outlines are useful enough in their way—one may call them indispensable if he will; their function is to keep the attention of the beginner fixed upon the essential features of the whole. But after the outlines become familiar, it is necessary to enter upon the detailed expositions which alone contain the living method of the system.

A word is demanded in this preface on the supposed antagonism of Induction to Speculative Philosophy. So long as the *deductive* and *inductive* methods are contrasted, no fault is to be found. But when the speculative method is identified with simple deduction, a protest must be made.

Deduction is no more speculative than Induction is. Both are defective, and have this peculiarity in common with all partial procedures: they each involve an unconscious procedure entirely the reverse of the conscious one which is named. How, for example, could one ever deduce anything without recognizing in the product something before familiar to him in some inductive shape or other? Let him follow out the strictest dialectical procedure, and commencing with the ultimate abstraction=Being (if he will); in this, what meaning soever he finds, implies other concepts; and since in the definition of his object he is carried beyond it, he calls this *deduction*; but the "other concepts" involved in the first had to be identified and named; they had to be defined before he could call his procedure a progress at all. No deduction was possible, therefore, until he identified those concepts that arose to view, with familiar names of concepts hitherto known to him empirically. The pure thinker who saw the dialectical procedure without being able to recognize its results would never be in a condition to describe it in words. Indeed, the mystics are those who see this movement of pure thought, but are so unacquainted with the scientific vocabulary of their language as not to identify the procedure under the conventional description; they therefore use concrete, sensuous expressions having analogies to the content they attempt to utter. In mystic philosophy, for this very reason, dependence upon the inductive factor is most apparent.

Not less, however, is Deduction an unconscious factor in all Induction. The inductive process could never take the first step above the concrete material before it except by the free process known in pure thought. Classification—indispensable to Induction—not only precedes generalization, but is the result of generalization. The act of induction seized as a whole is as creative as that of deduction. The inductive philosopher steps back from the details he has seized only by means of an act of identification of his pure thought with the con-

tent. The inductive philosopher who knows nothing of the pure thought-movement by itself, is at all times half unconscious of his entire activity. With this unconsciousness comes the danger of mistaking one-sided abstractions for concrete laws. The speculative cognition contains both phases—the deductive and inductive; but not as distinct processes. The syllogism in which the Particular, the Individual, and the Universal are—not successively, but simultaneously—the middle term, is no longer a mere syllogism, but is the form of “knowing by wholes” of which Plato speaks.

But one abstract process necessitates another; and any system of Philosophy which lays undue stress on one side of its content is sure to be accompanied by a system which lays undue stress on the other side. Only by this means can the whole preserve its equilibrium. To have a tension there must be two extremes. And although two systems of Philosophy may form the conscious extremes, yet in every system both extremes will be found—the one consciously and the other unconsciously supported by the philosopher if his system is one-sided. The true speculative system, like that of Aristotle or Hegel, will consciously support both in one. And yet by reason of the fact that for each individual a long process of culture is necessary before he can attain that “knowing by wholes” spoken of, the knowing of most individuals must be *knowing of parts*. Hence the disciples of a comprehensive system of Philosophy branch out in different directions, and soon lose sight of each other and of their master. The Epicureans, the Stoics, the Skeptics, all arise in Aristotle, and so too do the different Eclectic schools, although called new Pythagoreans, new Platonists, &c. It is by these *different* systems alone that the whole truth gets thought, and he who would think truest and deepest must be able to see the eternal verities in the most widely differing systems—adding thereto whatever insight is necessary to see the unconscious implications as well as the consciously assumed positions. Thus the History of Philosophy contains the true exhibition of Philosophy itself.

Again, as to the value which Speculative Philosophy assigns to FACTS. The same mistake is current here that obtains in regard to Deduction and Induction. As we have said elsewhere, the man of science and the speculative seer both seek to grasp the *fact*; but what is the compass of the fact? Here it is likely the difference will be found. In proportion as the total or entire fact is seized and treated of—either with or without the details—the book containing the exposition thereof will be called obscure, or “mystical.”

A fact in its narrower compass is easily seized; he who runs may read and understand. But the exposition of a fact in its widest relations is a “mere ingenious arrangement of words” to the one who is not equal to the task of rethinking those relations.

The direct fall of an apple from the tree is a fact to the swine who run to devour it; the thoughtful man, however, sees involved in one fact the fall of the apple and the shaking of the tree by the wind, perhaps the wind occasioned by the southward movement of the sun to the equinox, and this by the inclination of the axis of the earth and the revolution around the sun, and so on throughout the entire complex of existence in time and space. A FACT IS A RELATIVE SYNTHESIS: and since it is determined by all that exists in the universe as the totality of its conditions, we cannot seize any fact in its entire compass except by thinking the universe.

Aristotle's works, taken as a whole, are an attempt to seize the facts of the world in their entirety—each fact in *its* entirety. And he finds that the entirety of each fact—each fact grasped in all its conditioning relations—is the entirety of all facts; in short, that the ultimate fact is one, and that, namely, what Plato calls *the Self-moved One*. Now, it happens that the hundreds who read Aristotle seize readily the many individual facts there treated of, and never mistrust their ability to grasp all that is found in the book; but still they miss the universal fact which Aristotle has undertaken to explicate, and which, indeed, was the sole object he had in writing any one of his numerous treatises.

We hold with convulsive grasp to the sensuous reality, not thinking that the nearer we get to it the more distracted we must become by reason of the eternal change going on in that sphere. "The more real, the more interpenetrated by the time-element," says Heraclitus, i. e. the particular individual is in a process of change. Truth is the opposite of reality in this respect, for the truth is eternal, "far removed from birth and decay." It is therefore a necessity of all thinking spiritual being to *abstract* from the sensuous reality, for by abstraction alone can it become spiritual; he who would attain truth itself must *energize* (to use an Aristotelian expression) to free himself from the changing and the variable. No matter how much one persuades himself that he is holding fast to the sensuous fact, and that he is thereby getting hold of the real, he is nevertheless always engaged in transforming immediate facts into truths; he relentlessly annuls the sensuous condition, and widens the sphere of the object considered, until it loses all the sensuous content it possesses. The *desideratum* is that every one shall become conscious of himself—shall come to know his activity as it truly is and must be. He who does this, will not set up one-sided systems, whether materialistic or metaphysical, but will be a practical thinker.